Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The Court clarified that the specification does not always need to “describe with particularity how to make and use every single embodiment within a claimed class.” Id. at 610-11. However, “[i]f a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class….The more one claims, the more one must enable.” Id.

The Court clarified that the specification does not always need to “describe with particularity how to make and use every single embodiment within a claimed class.” Id. at 610-11. However, “[i]f a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class….The more one claims, the more one must enable.” Id.

The Court clarified that the specification does not always need to “describe with particularity how to make and use every single embodiment within a claimed class.” Id. at 610-11. However, “[i]f a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class….The more one claims, the more one must enable.” Id.

The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, “it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality… running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose” and “disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset.” Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors.”). Moreover, “[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.

The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, “it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality… running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose” and “disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset.” Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors.”). Moreover, “[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.

A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.

A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.

A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.

A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.

A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, “it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality… running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose” and “disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset.” Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors.”). Moreover, “[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.

The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, “it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality… running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose” and “disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset.” Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors.”). Moreover, “[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.

In Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023), the Supreme Court, held that claims drawn to a genus of monoclonal antibodies, which were functionally claimed by their ability to bind to a specific protein, PCSK9, were invalid due to lack of enablement. The claims at issue were functional, in that they defined the genus by its function (the ability to bind to specific residues of PCSK9) as opposed to reciting a specific structure (the amino acid sequence of the antibodies in the genus). The Supreme Court concluded that the patents at issue failed to adequately enable the full scope of the genus of antibodies that performed the function of binding to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9 and blocking the binding of PCSK9 to a particular cholesterol receptor, LDLR.

In Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023), the Supreme Court, held that claims drawn to a genus of monoclonal antibodies, which were functionally claimed by their ability to bind to a specific protein, PCSK9, were invalid due to lack of enablement. The claims at issue were functional, in that they defined the genus by its function (the ability to bind to specific residues of PCSK9) as opposed to reciting a specific structure (the amino acid sequence of the antibodies in the genus). The Supreme Court concluded that the patents at issue failed to adequately enable the full scope of the genus of antibodies that performed the function of binding to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9 and blocking the binding of PCSK9 to a particular cholesterol receptor, LDLR.

In Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023), the Supreme Court, held that claims drawn to a genus of monoclonal antibodies, which were functionally claimed by their ability to bind to a specific protein, PCSK9, were invalid due to lack of enablement. The claims at issue were functional, in that they defined the genus by its function (the ability to bind to specific residues of PCSK9) as opposed to reciting a specific structure (the amino acid sequence of the antibodies in the genus). The Supreme Court concluded that the patents at issue failed to adequately enable the full scope of the genus of antibodies that performed the function of binding to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9 and blocking the binding of PCSK9 to a particular cholesterol receptor, LDLR.

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term “undue experimentation,” it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation.”). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, “it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality… running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose” and “disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset.” Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors.”). Moreover, “[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.