It is the policy of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that its employees, including patent examiners, will not appear as witnesses or give testimony in legal proceedings, except under the conditions specified in 37 CFR Part 104, Subpart C. The definitions set forth in 37 CFR 104.1 and the exceptions in 37 CFR 104.21 are applicable to this section. Any employee who testifies contrary to this policy will be dismissed or removed.

It is the policy of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that its employees, including patent examiners, will not appear as witnesses or give testimony in legal proceedings, except under the conditions specified in 37 CFR Part 104, Subpart C. The definitions set forth in 37 CFR 104.1 and the exceptions in 37 CFR 104.21 are applicable to this section. Any employee who testifies contrary to this policy will be dismissed or removed.

A request for testimony of an employee of the USPTO should be made to the Office of the USPTO General Counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the date of the expected testimony.

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).

Whenever an employee of the USPTO, including a patent examiner, is asked to testify or receives a subpoena, the employee shall immediately notify the Office of the USPTO General Counsel. Inquiries requesting testimony shall be also referred immediately to the Office of the USPTO General Counsel.

Any individual desiring the testimony of an employee of the USPTO, including the testimony of a patent examiner or other quasi-judicial employee, must comply with the provisions of 37 CFR Part 104, Subpart C.

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).

In view of the discussion above, if an employee is authorized to testify in connection with the employee’s involvement or assistance in a quasi-judicial proceeding which took place before the USPTO, the employee will not be permitted to give testimony in response to questions that the Office determines are impermissible. Impermissible questions include, but are not limited to, questions directed to discovering the mental processes or expertise of a quasi-judicial official, such as:

• (A) Information about that employee’s:
  • (1) Background;
  • (2) Expertise;
  • (3) Qualifications to examine or otherwise consider a particular patent or trademark application;
  • (4) Usual practice or whether the employee followed a procedure set out in any Office manual of practice (including the MPEP or TMEP) in a particular case;
  • (5) Consultation with another Office employee;
  • (6) Understanding of:
    • (a) A patented invention, an invention sought to be patented, or patent application, patent, reexamination or interference file;
    • (b) Prior art;
    • (c) Registered subject matter, subject matter sought to be registered, or a trademark application, registration, opposition, cancellation, interference, or concurrent use file;
    • (d) Any Office manual of practice;
    • (e) Office regulations;
    • (f) Patent, trademark, or other law; or
    • (g) The responsibilities of another Office employee;
  • (7) Reliance on particular facts or arguments;
• (B) To inquire into the manner in and extent to which the employee considered or studied material in performing a quasi-judicial function; or
• (C) To inquire into the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of that Office employee in performing the quasi-judicial function.

Whenever an employee of the USPTO, including a patent examiner, is asked to testify or receives a subpoena, the employee shall immediately notify the Office of the USPTO General Counsel. Inquiries requesting testimony shall be also referred immediately to the Office of the USPTO General Counsel.

Any request for testimony addressed or delivered to the Office of the USPTO General Counsel shall comply with 37 CFR 104.22(c). All requests must be in writing. The need for a subpoena may be obviated where the request complies with 37 CFR 104.22(c) if the party requesting the testimony further meets the following conditions:

• (A) The party requesting the testimony identifies the civil action or other legal proceeding for which the testimony is being taken. The identification shall include the:
  • (1) Style of the case;
  • (2) Civil action number;
  • (3) District in which the civil action is pending;
  • (4) Judge assigned to the case; and
  • (5) Name, address, and telephone number of counsel for all parties in the civil action.
• (B) The party agrees not to ask questions seeking information which is precluded by 37 CFR 104.23;
• (C) The party shall comply with applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 30, and give ten (10) working days notice to the Office of the USPTO General Counsel prior to the date a deposition is desired. Fifteen (15) working days notice is required for any deposition which is desired to be taken between November 15 and January 15;
• (D) The party agrees to notice the deposition at a place convenient to the USPTO. The Conference Room in the Office of the USPTO General Counsel is deemed to be a place convenient to the Office; and
• (E) The party agrees to supply a copy of the transcript of the deposition to the USPTO for its records.

Absent a written agreement meeting the conditions specified in paragraphs (A) through (E), a party must comply with the precise terms of 37 CFR 104.22(c) and the USPTO will not permit a deposition without issuance of a subpoena.

It is the policy of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that its employees, including patent examiners, will not appear as witnesses or give testimony in legal proceedings, except under the conditions specified in 37 CFR Part 104, Subpart C. The definitions set forth in 37 CFR 104.1 and the exceptions in 37 CFR 104.21 are applicable to this section. Any employee who testifies contrary to this policy will be dismissed or removed.

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).

If an employee is authorized to testify, the employee will be limited to testifying about facts within the employee’s personal knowledge. Employees are prohibited from giving expert or opinion testimony. Likewise, employees are prohibited from answering hypothetical or speculative questions. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 181 USPQ 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1969) (deposition of an examiner must be restricted to relevant matters of fact and must avoid any hypothetical or speculative questions or conclusions based thereon); ShafferTool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (deposition of examiner should be limited to matters of fact and must not go into hypothetical or speculative areas or the bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses, or conclusions of the examiner in acting upon a patent application). Employees will not be permitted to give testimony with respect to subject matter which is privileged. Several court decisions limit testimony with respect to quasi-judicial functions performed by employees. Those decisions include United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (improper to inquire into mental processes of quasi-judicial officer or to examine the manner and extent to which the officer considered an administrative record); Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 8 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent examiner may not be compelled to answer questions which probe the examiner’s technical knowledge of the subject matter of a patent); McCulloch Gas Processing Co. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d 1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (discovery of degree of expertise of individuals performing governmental functions not permitted); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 7 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (technical or scientific qualifications of examiners-in-chief are not legally relevant in appeal under 35 U.S.C. 134 since board members need not be skilled in the art to render obviousness decision); Lange v. Commissioner, 352 F. Supp. 116, 176 USPQ 162 (D.D.C. 1972) (technical qualifications of examiners-in-chief not relevant in 35 U.S.C. 145 action).