The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of the inventor's invention prior to the particular date. Specifically, “[t]he burden of showing actual reduction of practice is on the party seeking its benefit.” In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1317-18, 116 USPQ2d 1760 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(citing to In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice “amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts” and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR 1.131(b). In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit “asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when they occurred.”).

The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of the inventor's invention prior to the particular date. Specifically, “[t]he burden of showing actual reduction of practice is on the party seeking its benefit.” In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1317-18, 116 USPQ2d 1760 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(citing to In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice “amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts” and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR 1.131(b). In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit “asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when they occurred.”).

The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of the inventor's invention prior to the particular date. Specifically, “[t]he burden of showing actual reduction of practice is on the party seeking its benefit.” In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1317-18, 116 USPQ2d 1760 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(citing to In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice “amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts” and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR 1.131(b). In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit “asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when they occurred.”).

The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of the inventor's invention prior to the particular date. Specifically, “[t]he burden of showing actual reduction of practice is on the party seeking its benefit.” In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1317-18, 116 USPQ2d 1760 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(citing to In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice “amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts” and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR 1.131(b). In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit “asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when they occurred.”).

The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of the inventor's invention prior to the particular date. Specifically, “[t]he burden of showing actual reduction of practice is on the party seeking its benefit.” In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1317-18, 116 USPQ2d 1760 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(citing to In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice “amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts” and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR 1.131(b). In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit “asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when they occurred.”).

The essential thing to be shown under 37 CFR 1.131(a) is priority of invention and this may be done by any satisfactory evidence of the fact. FACTS, not conclusions, must be alleged. Evidence in the form of exhibits may accompany the affidavit or declaration. Each exhibit relied upon should be specifically referred to in the affidavit or declaration, in terms of what it is relied upon to show. For example, the allegations of fact might be supported by submitting as evidence one or more of the following:

• (A) attached sketches;
• (B) attached blueprints;
• (C) attached photographs;
• (D) attached reproductions of notebook entries;
• (E) an accompanying model;
• (F) attached supporting statements by witnesses, where verbal disclosures are the evidence relied upon. Ex parte Ovshinsky, 10 USPQ2d 1075 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989);
• (G) testimony given in an interference. Where interference testimony is used, the applicant must point out which parts of the testimony are being relied on; examiners cannot be expected to search the entire interference record for the evidence;
• (H) documents submitted under the Disclosure Document Program (discontinued February 1, 2007) may be used as documentary evidence of conception.

A general allegation that the invention was completed prior to the date of the reference is not sufficient. Similarly, a declaration by the inventor to the effect that their invention was conceived or reduced to practice prior to the reference date, without a statement of facts demonstrating the correctness of this conclusion, is insufficient to satisfy 37 CFR 1.131(a). “An inventor cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony to establish a prior invention date.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

A general allegation that the invention was completed prior to the date of the reference is not sufficient. Similarly, a declaration by the inventor to the effect that their invention was conceived or reduced to practice prior to the reference date, without a statement of facts demonstrating the correctness of this conclusion, is insufficient to satisfy 37 CFR 1.131(a). “An inventor cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony to establish a prior invention date.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

A general allegation that the invention was completed prior to the date of the reference is not sufficient. Similarly, a declaration by the inventor to the effect that their invention was conceived or reduced to practice prior to the reference date, without a statement of facts demonstrating the correctness of this conclusion, is insufficient to satisfy 37 CFR 1.131(a). “An inventor cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony to establish a prior invention date.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291, 99 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

[Editor Note: This MPEP section is not applicable to applications subject to the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA unless being relied upon to overcome a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). See 35 U.S.C. 100 (note) and MPEP § 2159. For a discussion of 37 CFR 1.130, affidavits or declarations of attribution or prior public disclosure in applications subject to the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA, see MPEP § 717. For a discussion of affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.131(c), see MPEP § 718.]

The purpose of filing a [37 CFR 1.]131 affidavit is not to demonstrate prior invention, per se, but merely to antedate the effective date of a reference. See In re Moore, 58 CCPA 1340, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (1971). Although the test for sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 131(b) parallels that for determining priority of invention in an interference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), it does not necessarily follow that Rule 131 practice is controlled by interference law. To the contrary, “[t]he parallel to interference practice found in Rule 131(b) should be recognized as one of convenience rather than necessity.” Id. at 1353, 444 F.2d at 580, 170 USPQ at 267. Thus, “the ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice’ which must be established under the rule need not be the same as what is required in the ‘interference’ sense of those terms.” Id.; accord, In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1974).

The purpose of filing a [37 CFR 1.]131 affidavit is not to demonstrate prior invention, per se, but merely to antedate the effective date of a reference. See In re Moore, 58 CCPA 1340, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (1971). Although the test for sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 131(b) parallels that for determining priority of invention in an interference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), it does not necessarily follow that Rule 131 practice is controlled by interference law. To the contrary, “[t]he parallel to interference practice found in Rule 131(b) should be recognized as one of convenience rather than necessity.” Id. at 1353, 444 F.2d at 580, 170 USPQ at 267. Thus, “the ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice’ which must be established under the rule need not be the same as what is required in the ‘interference’ sense of those terms.” Id.; accord, In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1974).

The facts to be established under 37 CFR 1.131(a) are similar to those to be proved in interference. The difference lies in the way in which the evidence is presented. If applicant disagrees with a holding that the facts are insufficient to overcome the rejection, the remedy is by appeal from the continued rejection.

The facts to be established under 37 CFR 1.131(a) are similar to those to be proved in interference. The difference lies in the way in which the evidence is presented. If applicant disagrees with a holding that the facts are insufficient to overcome the rejection, the remedy is by appeal from the continued rejection.

The facts to be established under 37 CFR 1.131(a) are similar to those to be proved in interference. The difference lies in the way in which the evidence is presented. If applicant disagrees with a holding that the facts are insufficient to overcome the rejection, the remedy is by appeal from the continued rejection.

The purpose of filing a [37 CFR 1.]131 affidavit is not to demonstrate prior invention, per se, but merely to antedate the effective date of a reference. See In re Moore, 58 CCPA 1340, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (1971). Although the test for sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 131(b) parallels that for determining priority of invention in an interference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), it does not necessarily follow that Rule 131 practice is controlled by interference law. To the contrary, “[t]he parallel to interference practice found in Rule 131(b) should be recognized as one of convenience rather than necessity.” Id. at 1353, 444 F.2d at 580, 170 USPQ at 267. Thus, “the ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice’ which must be established under the rule need not be the same as what is required in the ‘interference’ sense of those terms.” Id.; accord, In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1974).

The purpose of filing a [37 CFR 1.]131 affidavit is not to demonstrate prior invention, per se, but merely to antedate the effective date of a reference. See In re Moore, 58 CCPA 1340, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (1971). Although the test for sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 131(b) parallels that for determining priority of invention in an interference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), it does not necessarily follow that Rule 131 practice is controlled by interference law. To the contrary, “[t]he parallel to interference practice found in Rule 131(b) should be recognized as one of convenience rather than necessity.” Id. at 1353, 444 F.2d at 580, 170 USPQ at 267. Thus, “the ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice’ which must be established under the rule need not be the same as what is required in the ‘interference’ sense of those terms.” Id.; accord, In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1974).

The purpose of filing a [37 CFR 1.]131 affidavit is not to demonstrate prior invention, per se, but merely to antedate the effective date of a reference. See In re Moore, 58 CCPA 1340, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (1971). Although the test for sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 131(b) parallels that for determining priority of invention in an interference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), it does not necessarily follow that Rule 131 practice is controlled by interference law. To the contrary, “[t]he parallel to interference practice found in Rule 131(b) should be recognized as one of convenience rather than necessity.” Id. at 1353, 444 F.2d at 580, 170 USPQ at 267. Thus, “the ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice’ which must be established under the rule need not be the same as what is required in the ‘interference’ sense of those terms.” Id.; accord, In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1974).

One difference is that in interference practice a reduction to practice requires a proof that a utility was known, whereas under 37 CFR 1.131(a) practice, proof of a utility must be shown only if the reference discloses a utility. In re Wilkinson, 304 F.2d 673, 134 USPQ 171 (CCPA 1962); In re Moore, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (CCPA 1971). Where proof of utility is required, whether or not test results are required to establish the utility of the subject matter in question depends on the facts of each case. The ultimate issue is whether the evidence is such that one of ordinary skill in the art would be satisfied to a reasonable certainty that the subject matter necessary to antedate the reference possessed the alleged utility. In re Blake, 358 F.2d 750, 149 USPQ 217 (CCPA 1966). Also, in interference practice, conception, reasonable diligence, and reduction to practice require corroboration, whereas averments made in a 37 CFR 1.131(a) affidavit or declaration do not require corroboration; an applicant may stand on their own affidavit or declaration if they so elect. Ex parte Hook, 102 USPQ 130 (Bd. App. 1953).

One difference is that in interference practice a reduction to practice requires a proof that a utility was known, whereas under 37 CFR 1.131(a) practice, proof of a utility must be shown only if the reference discloses a utility. In re Wilkinson, 304 F.2d 673, 134 USPQ 171 (CCPA 1962); In re Moore, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (CCPA 1971). Where proof of utility is required, whether or not test results are required to establish the utility of the subject matter in question depends on the facts of each case. The ultimate issue is whether the evidence is such that one of ordinary skill in the art would be satisfied to a reasonable certainty that the subject matter necessary to antedate the reference possessed the alleged utility. In re Blake, 358 F.2d 750, 149 USPQ 217 (CCPA 1966). Also, in interference practice, conception, reasonable diligence, and reduction to practice require corroboration, whereas averments made in a 37 CFR 1.131(a) affidavit or declaration do not require corroboration; an applicant may stand on their own affidavit or declaration if they so elect. Ex parte Hook, 102 USPQ 130 (Bd. App. 1953).

One difference is that in interference practice a reduction to practice requires a proof that a utility was known, whereas under 37 CFR 1.131(a) practice, proof of a utility must be shown only if the reference discloses a utility. In re Wilkinson, 304 F.2d 673, 134 USPQ 171 (CCPA 1962); In re Moore, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (CCPA 1971). Where proof of utility is required, whether or not test results are required to establish the utility of the subject matter in question depends on the facts of each case. The ultimate issue is whether the evidence is such that one of ordinary skill in the art would be satisfied to a reasonable certainty that the subject matter necessary to antedate the reference possessed the alleged utility. In re Blake, 358 F.2d 750, 149 USPQ 217 (CCPA 1966). Also, in interference practice, conception, reasonable diligence, and reduction to practice require corroboration, whereas averments made in a 37 CFR 1.131(a) affidavit or declaration do not require corroboration; an applicant may stand on their own affidavit or declaration if they so elect. Ex parte Hook, 102 USPQ 130 (Bd. App. 1953).

[Editor Note: This MPEP section is not applicable to applications subject to the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA unless being relied upon to overcome a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). See 35 U.S.C. 100 (note) and MPEP § 2159. For a discussion of 37 CFR 1.130, affidavits or declarations of attribution or prior public disclosure in applications subject to the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA, see MPEP § 717. For a discussion of affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.131(c), see MPEP § 718.]

[Editor Note: This MPEP section is not applicable to applications subject to the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA unless being relied upon to overcome a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). See 35 U.S.C. 100 (note) and MPEP § 2159. For a discussion of 37 CFR 1.130, affidavits or declarations of attribution or prior public disclosure in applications subject to the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA, see MPEP § 717. For a discussion of affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.131(c), see MPEP § 718.]

Exhibits and models must comply with the requirements of 37 CFR 1.91 to be entered into an application file. See also MPEP § 715.07(d).

As discussed above, 37 CFR 1.131(b) provides three ways in which an applicant can establish prior invention of the claimed subject matter. The showing of facts must be sufficient to show:

• (A) actual reduction to practice of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference; or
• (B) conception of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligence from prior to the reference date to a subsequent actual reduction to practice; or
• (C) conception of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligence from prior to the reference date to the filing date of the application (constructive reduction to practice).

The purpose of filing a [37 CFR 1.]131 affidavit is not to demonstrate prior invention, per se, but merely to antedate the effective date of a reference. See In re Moore, 58 CCPA 1340, 444 F.2d 572, 170 USPQ 260 (1971). Although the test for sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 131(b) parallels that for determining priority of invention in an interference under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), it does not necessarily follow that Rule 131 practice is controlled by interference law. To the contrary, “[t]he parallel to interference practice found in Rule 131(b) should be recognized as one of convenience rather than necessity.” Id. at 1353, 444 F.2d at 580, 170 USPQ at 267. Thus, “the ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice’ which must be established under the rule need not be the same as what is required in the ‘interference’ sense of those terms.” Id.; accord, In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1974).