In the case where the claimed ranges “overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed by the prior art” a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (The prior art taught carbon monoxide concentrations of “about 1-5%” while the claim was limited to “more than 5%.” The court held that “about 1-5%” allowed for concentrations slightly above 5% thus the ranges overlapped.); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-71, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Claim reciting thickness of a protective layer as falling within a range of “50 to 100 Angstroms” considered prima facie obvious in view of prior art reference teaching that “for suitable protection, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about 10 nm [i.e., 100 Angstroms].” The court stated that “by stating that ‘suitable protection’ is provided if the protective layer is ‘about’ 100 Angstroms thick, [the prior art reference] directly teaches the use of a thickness within [applicant’s] claimed range.”). See also In re Bergen, 120 F.2d 329, 332, 49 USPQ 749, 751-52 (CCPA 1941) (The court found that the overlapping endpoint of the prior art and claimed range was sufficient to support an obviousness rejection, particularly when there was no showing of criticality of the claimed range).

In the case where the claimed ranges “overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed by the prior art” a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (The prior art taught carbon monoxide concentrations of “about 1-5%” while the claim was limited to “more than 5%.” The court held that “about 1-5%” allowed for concentrations slightly above 5% thus the ranges overlapped.); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-71, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Claim reciting thickness of a protective layer as falling within a range of “50 to 100 Angstroms” considered prima facie obvious in view of prior art reference teaching that “for suitable protection, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about 10 nm [i.e., 100 Angstroms].” The court stated that “by stating that ‘suitable protection’ is provided if the protective layer is ‘about’ 100 Angstroms thick, [the prior art reference] directly teaches the use of a thickness within [applicant’s] claimed range.”). See also In re Bergen, 120 F.2d 329, 332, 49 USPQ 749, 751-52 (CCPA 1941) (The court found that the overlapping endpoint of the prior art and claimed range was sufficient to support an obviousness rejection, particularly when there was no showing of criticality of the claimed range).

Similarly, a prima facie case of obviousness exists where the claimed ranges or amounts do not overlap with the prior art but are merely close. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 783, 227 USPQ 773, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Court held as proper a rejection of a claim directed to an alloy of “having 0.8% nickel, 0.3% molybdenum, up to 0.1% iron, balance titanium” as obvious over a reference disclosing alloys of 0.75% nickel, 0.25% molybdenum, balance titanium and 0.94% nickel, 0.31% molybdenum, balance titanium. “The proportions are so close that prima facie one skilled in the art would have expected them to have the same properties.”). See also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997) (under the doctrine of equivalents, a purification process using a pH of 5.0 could infringe a patented purification process requiring a pH of 6.0-9.0); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205-206 (CCPA 1946) (prior art showed an angle in a groove of up to 90° and an applicant claimed an angle of no less than 120°); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931, 934, 24 USPQ 52, 55 (CCPA 1934)(the prior art, which taught about 0.7:1 of alkali to water, renders unpatentable a claim that increased the proportion to at least 1:1 because there was no showing that the claimed proportions were critical); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924, 20 USPQ 53, 57 (CCPA 1933)(the prior art teaching an alkali cellulose containing minimal amounts of water, found by the Examiner to be in the 5-8% range, the claims sought to be patented were to an alkali cellulose with varying higher ranges of water (e.g., “not substantially less than 13%,” “not substantially below 17%,” and “between about 13[%] and 20%”); K-Swiss Inc. v. Glide N Lock GmbH, 567 Fed. App'x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(reversing the Board's decision, in an appeal of an inter partes reexamination proceeding, that certain claims were not prima facie obvious due to non-overlapping ranges); In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1177, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(the court found a prima facie case of obviousness had been made in a predictable art wherein the claimed range of “less than 6 pounds per cubic feet” and the prior art range of “between 6 lbs./ft 3 and 25 lbs./ft 3 ” were so mathematically close that the difference between the claimed ranges was virtually negligible absent any showing of unexpected results or criticality.).

Similarly, a prima facie case of obviousness exists where the claimed ranges or amounts do not overlap with the prior art but are merely close. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 783, 227 USPQ 773, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Court held as proper a rejection of a claim directed to an alloy of “having 0.8% nickel, 0.3% molybdenum, up to 0.1% iron, balance titanium” as obvious over a reference disclosing alloys of 0.75% nickel, 0.25% molybdenum, balance titanium and 0.94% nickel, 0.31% molybdenum, balance titanium. “The proportions are so close that prima facie one skilled in the art would have expected them to have the same properties.”). See also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997) (under the doctrine of equivalents, a purification process using a pH of 5.0 could infringe a patented purification process requiring a pH of 6.0-9.0); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205-206 (CCPA 1946) (prior art showed an angle in a groove of up to 90° and an applicant claimed an angle of no less than 120°); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931, 934, 24 USPQ 52, 55 (CCPA 1934)(the prior art, which taught about 0.7:1 of alkali to water, renders unpatentable a claim that increased the proportion to at least 1:1 because there was no showing that the claimed proportions were critical); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924, 20 USPQ 53, 57 (CCPA 1933)(the prior art teaching an alkali cellulose containing minimal amounts of water, found by the Examiner to be in the 5-8% range, the claims sought to be patented were to an alkali cellulose with varying higher ranges of water (e.g., “not substantially less than 13%,” “not substantially below 17%,” and “between about 13[%] and 20%”); K-Swiss Inc. v. Glide N Lock GmbH, 567 Fed. App'x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(reversing the Board's decision, in an appeal of an inter partes reexamination proceeding, that certain claims were not prima facie obvious due to non-overlapping ranges); In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1177, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(the court found a prima facie case of obviousness had been made in a predictable art wherein the claimed range of “less than 6 pounds per cubic feet” and the prior art range of “between 6 lbs./ft 3 and 25 lbs./ft 3 ” were so mathematically close that the difference between the claimed ranges was virtually negligible absent any showing of unexpected results or criticality.).

"[A] prior art reference that discloses a range encompassing a somewhat narrower claimed range is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness." In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330, 65 USPQ2d 1379, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 74 USPQ2d 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (claimed alloy held obvious over prior art alloy that taught ranges of weight percentages overlapping, and in most instances completely encompassing, claimed ranges; furthermore, narrower ranges taught by reference overlapped all but one range in claimed invention). However, if the reference’s disclosed range is so broad as to encompass a very large number of possible distinct compositions, this might present a situation analogous to the obviousness of a species when the prior art broadly discloses a genus. Id. See also In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383, 29 USPQ2d 1550, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[a] disclosure of millions of compounds does not render obvious a claim to three compounds, particularly when that disclosure indicates a preference leading away from the claimed compounds.”); MPEP § 2144.08; and subsection III.D below for an additional discussion on consideration of prior art disclosures of a broad range.

Applicants can rebut a prima facie case of obviousness by showing the criticality of the range. “The law is replete with cases in which the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the claims…. In such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916) (a patent based on a change in the proportions of a prior product or process (changing from 4-10% oil to 1% oil) must be confined to the proportions that were shown to be critical (1%)); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205 (CCPA 1946) (“Where the issue of criticality is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a proper showing of the facts upon which he relies.”); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924 (CCPA 1933) (“It is well established that, while a change in the proportions of a combination shown to be old, such as is here involved, may be inventive, such changes must be critical as compared with the proportions used in the prior processes, producing a difference in kind rather than degree.”); In re Wells, 56 F.2d 674, 675, 12 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1932) (“Changes in proportions of agents used in combinations… in order to be patentable, must be critical as compared with the proportions of the prior processes.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018.)(“[A] modification of a process parameter may be patentable if it ‘produce[s] a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art.” (citing Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955); UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 693, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“A difference of degree is not as persuasive as a difference in kind – i.e., if the range produces ‘a new property dissimilar to the known property,’ rather than producing a predictable result but to an unexpected extent.”).

A prima facie case of obviousness may also be rebutted by showing that the art, in any material respect, teaches away from the claimed invention. U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-2 (1966). See also Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326, 90 USPQ2d 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“An inference of nonobviousness is especially strong where the prior art’s teachings undermine the very reason being proffered as to why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the known elements.”) and Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1305, 115 USPQ2d 2012, 2019 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (The prior art taught away from use of 200 ppm benzalkonium chloride (“BAK”), as claimed, teaching “that BAK should be minimized in ophthalmic formulations to avoid safety problems”.).

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

In the case where the claimed ranges “overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed by the prior art” a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (The prior art taught carbon monoxide concentrations of “about 1-5%” while the claim was limited to “more than 5%.” The court held that “about 1-5%” allowed for concentrations slightly above 5% thus the ranges overlapped.); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-71, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Claim reciting thickness of a protective layer as falling within a range of “50 to 100 Angstroms” considered prima facie obvious in view of prior art reference teaching that “for suitable protection, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about 10 nm [i.e., 100 Angstroms].” The court stated that “by stating that ‘suitable protection’ is provided if the protective layer is ‘about’ 100 Angstroms thick, [the prior art reference] directly teaches the use of a thickness within [applicant’s] claimed range.”). See also In re Bergen, 120 F.2d 329, 332, 49 USPQ 749, 751-52 (CCPA 1941) (The court found that the overlapping endpoint of the prior art and claimed range was sufficient to support an obviousness rejection, particularly when there was no showing of criticality of the claimed range).

In the case where the claimed ranges “overlap or lie inside ranges disclosed by the prior art” a prima facie case of obviousness exists. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (The prior art taught carbon monoxide concentrations of “about 1-5%” while the claim was limited to “more than 5%.” The court held that “about 1-5%” allowed for concentrations slightly above 5% thus the ranges overlapped.); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469-71, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Claim reciting thickness of a protective layer as falling within a range of “50 to 100 Angstroms” considered prima facie obvious in view of prior art reference teaching that “for suitable protection, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about 10 nm [i.e., 100 Angstroms].” The court stated that “by stating that ‘suitable protection’ is provided if the protective layer is ‘about’ 100 Angstroms thick, [the prior art reference] directly teaches the use of a thickness within [applicant’s] claimed range.”). See also In re Bergen, 120 F.2d 329, 332, 49 USPQ 749, 751-52 (CCPA 1941) (The court found that the overlapping endpoint of the prior art and claimed range was sufficient to support an obviousness rejection, particularly when there was no showing of criticality of the claimed range).

Similarly, a prima facie case of obviousness exists where the claimed ranges or amounts do not overlap with the prior art but are merely close. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 783, 227 USPQ 773, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Court held as proper a rejection of a claim directed to an alloy of “having 0.8% nickel, 0.3% molybdenum, up to 0.1% iron, balance titanium” as obvious over a reference disclosing alloys of 0.75% nickel, 0.25% molybdenum, balance titanium and 0.94% nickel, 0.31% molybdenum, balance titanium. “The proportions are so close that prima facie one skilled in the art would have expected them to have the same properties.”). See also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997) (under the doctrine of equivalents, a purification process using a pH of 5.0 could infringe a patented purification process requiring a pH of 6.0-9.0); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205-206 (CCPA 1946) (prior art showed an angle in a groove of up to 90° and an applicant claimed an angle of no less than 120°); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931, 934, 24 USPQ 52, 55 (CCPA 1934)(the prior art, which taught about 0.7:1 of alkali to water, renders unpatentable a claim that increased the proportion to at least 1:1 because there was no showing that the claimed proportions were critical); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924, 20 USPQ 53, 57 (CCPA 1933)(the prior art teaching an alkali cellulose containing minimal amounts of water, found by the Examiner to be in the 5-8% range, the claims sought to be patented were to an alkali cellulose with varying higher ranges of water (e.g., “not substantially less than 13%,” “not substantially below 17%,” and “between about 13[%] and 20%”); K-Swiss Inc. v. Glide N Lock GmbH, 567 Fed. App'x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(reversing the Board's decision, in an appeal of an inter partes reexamination proceeding, that certain claims were not prima facie obvious due to non-overlapping ranges); In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1177, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(the court found a prima facie case of obviousness had been made in a predictable art wherein the claimed range of “less than 6 pounds per cubic feet” and the prior art range of “between 6 lbs./ft 3 and 25 lbs./ft 3 ” were so mathematically close that the difference between the claimed ranges was virtually negligible absent any showing of unexpected results or criticality.).

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

In order to properly support a rejection on the basis that an invention is the result of “routine optimization”, the examiner must make findings of relevant facts, and present the underpinning reasoning in sufficient detail. The articulated rationale must include an explanation of why it would have been routine optimization to arrive at the claimed invention and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success to formulate the claimed range. See In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346, 123 USPQ2d 1838, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359,1361,121 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Absent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.’”); Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[R]eferences to ‘common sense’ … cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support ….”).

In order to properly support a rejection on the basis that an invention is the result of “routine optimization”, the examiner must make findings of relevant facts, and present the underpinning reasoning in sufficient detail. The articulated rationale must include an explanation of why it would have been routine optimization to arrive at the claimed invention and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success to formulate the claimed range. See In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346, 123 USPQ2d 1838, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359,1361,121 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Absent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.’”); Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[R]eferences to ‘common sense’ … cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support ….”).

Applicants can rebut a prima facie case of obviousness by showing the criticality of the range. “The law is replete with cases in which the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the claims…. In such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916) (a patent based on a change in the proportions of a prior product or process (changing from 4-10% oil to 1% oil) must be confined to the proportions that were shown to be critical (1%)); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205 (CCPA 1946) (“Where the issue of criticality is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a proper showing of the facts upon which he relies.”); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924 (CCPA 1933) (“It is well established that, while a change in the proportions of a combination shown to be old, such as is here involved, may be inventive, such changes must be critical as compared with the proportions used in the prior processes, producing a difference in kind rather than degree.”); In re Wells, 56 F.2d 674, 675, 12 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1932) (“Changes in proportions of agents used in combinations… in order to be patentable, must be critical as compared with the proportions of the prior processes.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018.)(“[A] modification of a process parameter may be patentable if it ‘produce[s] a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art.” (citing Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955); UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 693, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“A difference of degree is not as persuasive as a difference in kind – i.e., if the range produces ‘a new property dissimilar to the known property,’ rather than producing a predictable result but to an unexpected extent.”).

Applicants can rebut a prima facie case of obviousness by showing the criticality of the range. “The law is replete with cases in which the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the claims…. In such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916) (a patent based on a change in the proportions of a prior product or process (changing from 4-10% oil to 1% oil) must be confined to the proportions that were shown to be critical (1%)); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205 (CCPA 1946) (“Where the issue of criticality is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a proper showing of the facts upon which he relies.”); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924 (CCPA 1933) (“It is well established that, while a change in the proportions of a combination shown to be old, such as is here involved, may be inventive, such changes must be critical as compared with the proportions used in the prior processes, producing a difference in kind rather than degree.”); In re Wells, 56 F.2d 674, 675, 12 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1932) (“Changes in proportions of agents used in combinations… in order to be patentable, must be critical as compared with the proportions of the prior processes.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018.)(“[A] modification of a process parameter may be patentable if it ‘produce[s] a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art.” (citing Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955); UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 693, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“A difference of degree is not as persuasive as a difference in kind – i.e., if the range produces ‘a new property dissimilar to the known property,’ rather than producing a predictable result but to an unexpected extent.”).

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

One factor that may weigh against maintaining an obviousness rejection based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art is where an applicant establishes that the prior art disclosure of the variable is within a range that is so broad in light of the dissimilar characteristics of the members of the range as to not invite optimization by one of skill in the art. Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291, 1306, 99 USPQ2d 1713, 1725 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that ordinary motivation to optimize did not apply where disclosure was 68,000 protein variants including 2,332 amino acids where one of skill in the art would appreciate that the claimed truncated proteins vary enormously in structure). See MPEP §§ 2131.02, 2131.03, and 2144.08 for additional discussion on consideration of range limitations.

One factor that may weigh against maintaining an obviousness rejection based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art is where an applicant establishes that the prior art disclosure of the variable is within a range that is so broad in light of the dissimilar characteristics of the members of the range as to not invite optimization by one of skill in the art. Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291, 1306, 99 USPQ2d 1713, 1725 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that ordinary motivation to optimize did not apply where disclosure was 68,000 protein variants including 2,332 amino acids where one of skill in the art would appreciate that the claimed truncated proteins vary enormously in structure). See MPEP §§ 2131.02, 2131.03, and 2144.08 for additional discussion on consideration of range limitations.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

A range can be disclosed in multiple prior art references instead of in a single prior art reference depending on the specific facts of the case. Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a weight plate having 3 elongated openings that served as handles for transporting the weight plate. Multiple prior art patents each disclosed weight plates having 1, 2 or 4 elongated openings. 392 F.3d at 1319, 73 USPQ2d at 1226. The court stated that the claimed weight plate having 3 elongated openings fell within the “range” of the prior art and was thus presumed obvious. 392 F.3d at 1322, 73 USPQ2d at 1228. The court further stated that the “range” disclosed in multiple prior art patents is “a distinction without a difference” from previous range cases which involved a range disclosed in a single patent since the “prior art suggested that a larger number of elongated grips in the weight plates was beneficial… thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art look to the range appearing in the prior art.” Id.

See MPEP § 716.02 – § 716.02(g) for a discussion of criticality and unexpected results.

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Teaching away was not established in In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Applicant argued that the prior art taught away from use of a protective layer for a reflective article having a thickness within the claimed range of “50 to 100 Angstroms.” Specifically, a patent to Zehender, which was relied upon to reject applicant’s claim, included a statement that the thickness of the protective layer “should be not less than about [100 Angstroms].” The court held that the patent did not teach away from the claimed invention. “Zehender suggests that there are benefits to be derived from keeping the protective layer as thin as possible, consistent with achieving adequate protection. A thinner coating reduces light absorption and minimizes manufacturing time and expense. Thus, while Zehender expresses a preference for a thicker protective layer of 200-300 Angstroms, at the same time it provides the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to focus on thickness levels at the bottom of Zehender’s ‘suitable’ range- about 100 Angstroms- and to explore thickness levels below that range. The statement in Zehender that ‘[i]n general, the thickness of the protective layer should be not less than about [100 Angstroms]’ falls far short of the kind of teaching that would discourage one of skill in the art from fabricating a protective layer of 100 Angstroms or less. [W]e are therefore ‘not convinced that there was a sufficient teaching away in the art to overcome [the] strong case of obviousness’ made out by Zehender.”). See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.D., for a discussion of “teaching away” references.

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Similarly, a prima facie case of obviousness exists where the claimed ranges or amounts do not overlap with the prior art but are merely close. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 783, 227 USPQ 773, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Court held as proper a rejection of a claim directed to an alloy of “having 0.8% nickel, 0.3% molybdenum, up to 0.1% iron, balance titanium” as obvious over a reference disclosing alloys of 0.75% nickel, 0.25% molybdenum, balance titanium and 0.94% nickel, 0.31% molybdenum, balance titanium. “The proportions are so close that prima facie one skilled in the art would have expected them to have the same properties.”). See also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997) (under the doctrine of equivalents, a purification process using a pH of 5.0 could infringe a patented purification process requiring a pH of 6.0-9.0); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205-206 (CCPA 1946) (prior art showed an angle in a groove of up to 90° and an applicant claimed an angle of no less than 120°); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931, 934, 24 USPQ 52, 55 (CCPA 1934)(the prior art, which taught about 0.7:1 of alkali to water, renders unpatentable a claim that increased the proportion to at least 1:1 because there was no showing that the claimed proportions were critical); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924, 20 USPQ 53, 57 (CCPA 1933)(the prior art teaching an alkali cellulose containing minimal amounts of water, found by the Examiner to be in the 5-8% range, the claims sought to be patented were to an alkali cellulose with varying higher ranges of water (e.g., “not substantially less than 13%,” “not substantially below 17%,” and “between about 13[%] and 20%”); K-Swiss Inc. v. Glide N Lock GmbH, 567 Fed. App'x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(reversing the Board's decision, in an appeal of an inter partes reexamination proceeding, that certain claims were not prima facie obvious due to non-overlapping ranges); In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1177, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(the court found a prima facie case of obviousness had been made in a predictable art wherein the claimed range of “less than 6 pounds per cubic feet” and the prior art range of “between 6 lbs./ft 3 and 25 lbs./ft 3 ” were so mathematically close that the difference between the claimed ranges was virtually negligible absent any showing of unexpected results or criticality.).

In order to properly support a rejection on the basis that an invention is the result of “routine optimization”, the examiner must make findings of relevant facts, and present the underpinning reasoning in sufficient detail. The articulated rationale must include an explanation of why it would have been routine optimization to arrive at the claimed invention and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success to formulate the claimed range. See In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346, 123 USPQ2d 1838, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359,1361,121 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Absent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.’”); Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[R]eferences to ‘common sense’ … cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support ….”).

The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because “obvious to try” is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), the Supreme Court held that “obvious to try” was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a “design need” or “market demand” and there are a “finite number” of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421, 82 USPQ2d at 1397 (“The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’… When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103.”). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.

A prima facie case of obviousness may also be rebutted by showing that the art, in any material respect, teaches away from the claimed invention. U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-2 (1966). See also Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326, 90 USPQ2d 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“An inference of nonobviousness is especially strong where the prior art’s teachings undermine the very reason being proffered as to why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the known elements.”) and Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1305, 115 USPQ2d 2012, 2019 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (The prior art taught away from use of 200 ppm benzalkonium chloride (“BAK”), as claimed, teaching “that BAK should be minimized in ophthalmic formulations to avoid safety problems”.).

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. “[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 (“The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages.”); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Lab. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809, 10 USPQ2d 1843, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989)(Claimed ratios were obvious as being reached by routine procedures and producing predictable results); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(Claimed amount of wash solution was found to be unpatentable as a matter of routine optimization in the pertinent art, further supported by the prior art disclosure of the need to avoid undue amounts of wash solution); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(Claims were unpatentable because appellants failed to submit evidence of criticality to demonstrate that that the wear resistance of the protective layer in the claimed thickness range of 50-100 Angstroms was “unexpectedly good”); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1874) (a change in form, proportions, or degree “will not sustain a patent”); In re Williams, 36 F.2d 436, 438, 4 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1929) (“It is a settled principle of law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents doing the same thing as the original invention, by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results than prior inventions.”). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (identifying “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.”).

Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. “[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 (“The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages.”); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Lab. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809, 10 USPQ2d 1843, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989)(Claimed ratios were obvious as being reached by routine procedures and producing predictable results); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(Claimed amount of wash solution was found to be unpatentable as a matter of routine optimization in the pertinent art, further supported by the prior art disclosure of the need to avoid undue amounts of wash solution); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(Claims were unpatentable because appellants failed to submit evidence of criticality to demonstrate that that the wear resistance of the protective layer in the claimed thickness range of 50-100 Angstroms was “unexpectedly good”); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1874) (a change in form, proportions, or degree “will not sustain a patent”); In re Williams, 36 F.2d 436, 438, 4 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1929) (“It is a settled principle of law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents doing the same thing as the original invention, by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results than prior inventions.”). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (identifying “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.”).

Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. “[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 (“The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages.”); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Lab. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809, 10 USPQ2d 1843, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989)(Claimed ratios were obvious as being reached by routine procedures and producing predictable results); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(Claimed amount of wash solution was found to be unpatentable as a matter of routine optimization in the pertinent art, further supported by the prior art disclosure of the need to avoid undue amounts of wash solution); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(Claims were unpatentable because appellants failed to submit evidence of criticality to demonstrate that that the wear resistance of the protective layer in the claimed thickness range of 50-100 Angstroms was “unexpectedly good”); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1874) (a change in form, proportions, or degree “will not sustain a patent”); In re Williams, 36 F.2d 436, 438, 4 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1929) (“It is a settled principle of law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents doing the same thing as the original invention, by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results than prior inventions.”). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (identifying “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.”).

The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because “obvious to try” is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), the Supreme Court held that “obvious to try” was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a “design need” or “market demand” and there are a “finite number” of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421, 82 USPQ2d at 1397 (“The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’… When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103.”). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.

The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because “obvious to try” is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), the Supreme Court held that “obvious to try” was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a “design need” or “market demand” and there are a “finite number” of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421, 82 USPQ2d at 1397 (“The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’… When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103.”). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.

The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because “obvious to try” is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), the Supreme Court held that “obvious to try” was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a “design need” or “market demand” and there are a “finite number” of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421, 82 USPQ2d at 1397 (“The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’… When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103.”). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.

The Supreme Court has clarified that an "obvious to try" line of reasoning may properly support an obviousness rejection. In In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977), the CCPA held that a particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation, because “obvious to try” is not a valid rationale for an obviousness finding. However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), the Supreme Court held that “obvious to try” was a valid rationale for an obviousness finding, for example, when there is a “design need” or “market demand” and there are a “finite number” of solutions. 550 U.S. at 421, 82 USPQ2d at 1397 (“The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘[o]bvious to try.’… When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §103.”). Thus, after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process.

Applicant can rebut a presumption of obviousness based on a claimed invention that falls within a prior art range by showing “(1) [t]hat the prior art taught away from the claimed invention…or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322, 73 USPQ2d 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court found that patentee offered neither evidence of teaching away of the prior art nor new and unexpected results of the claimed invention drawn to a weight plate having three elongated handle openings. 392 F.3d at 1323, 73 USPQ2d at 1229. The court then turned to the patentee’s secondary considerations evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, satisfaction of a long-felt need, and copying by others and found that Iron Grip had failed to establish: (A) a nexus between the licensing of its patent to three competitors and the “merits of the invention”; (B) that a competitor copied the claimed three-hole grip plate because “[n]ot every competing product that falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying” and “[o]therwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent”; and (C) a long-felt but unmet need for the claimed three-hole grip plate prior to its patent because “[a]bsent a showing of a long-felt need or the failure of others, the mere passage of time without the claimed invention is not evidence of nonobviousness.” 392 F.3d at 1324-25, 73 USPQ2d at 1229-30. See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).
73 USPQ2d at 1229-30 See also In re Brandt, 886 F.3d 1171, 1178, 126 USPQ2d 1079, 1083-1084 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The court determined the prior art did not teach away from the claimed invention because it only suggested that a denser coverboard could serve to protect a less dense insulation board and did not require a coverboard denser than 6 lbs./ft 3).

Applicants may rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on optimization of a variable disclosed in a range in the prior art by showing that the claimed variable was not recognized in the prior art to be a result-effective variable. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (“The idea behind the ‘result-effective variable’ analysis is straightforward. Our predecessor court reasoned that a person of ordinary skill would not always be motivated to optimize a parameter ‘if there is no evidence in the record that the prior art recognized that [that] particular parameter affected the result.’ Antonie, 559 F.2d at 620.) For example, in Antonie the claimed device was characterized by a certain ratio, and the prior art did not disclose that ratio and was silent regarding one of the variables in the ratio. Id. at 619. Our predecessor court thus reversed the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 620. Antonie described the situation where a ‘parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable’ as an ‘exception' to the general principle in Aller that 'the discovery of an optimum value of a variable in a known process is normally obvious.’ Id. at 620. Our subsequent cases have confirmed that this exception is a narrow one. … In summarizing the relevant precedent from our predecessor court, we observed in Applied Materials that ‘[i]n cases in which the disclosure in the prior art was insufficient to find a variable result-effective, there was essentially no disclosure of the relationship between the variable and the result in the prior art.' 692 F.3d at 1297. Likewise, if the prior art does recognize that the variable affects the relevant property or result, then the variable is result-effective. Id. (‘A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.’)”). Applicants must articulate why the variable at issue would not have been recognized in the prior art as result-effective. However, it should be noted that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See subsection II.B above for additional information about consideration of result-effective variables within an obviousness analysis.

See MPEP § 2131.03 for case law pertaining to rejections based on the anticipation of ranges under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 35 U.S.C. 102 / 103.

Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. “[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 (“The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages.”); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Lab. Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809, 10 USPQ2d 1843, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989)(Claimed ratios were obvious as being reached by routine procedures and producing predictable results); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(Claimed amount of wash solution was found to be unpatentable as a matter of routine optimization in the pertinent art, further supported by the prior art disclosure of the need to avoid undue amounts of wash solution); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(Claims were unpatentable because appellants failed to submit evidence of criticality to demonstrate that that the wear resistance of the protective layer in the claimed thickness range of 50-100 Angstroms was “unexpectedly good”); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1874) (a change in form, proportions, or degree “will not sustain a patent”); In re Williams, 36 F.2d 436, 438, 4 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1929) (“It is a settled principle of law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents doing the same thing as the original invention, by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results than prior inventions.”). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (identifying “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.”).

Applicants can rebut a prima facie case of obviousness by showing the criticality of the range. “The law is replete with cases in which the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the claims…. In such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916) (a patent based on a change in the proportions of a prior product or process (changing from 4-10% oil to 1% oil) must be confined to the proportions that were shown to be critical (1%)); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205 (CCPA 1946) (“Where the issue of criticality is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a proper showing of the facts upon which he relies.”); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys.”); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924 (CCPA 1933) (“It is well established that, while a change in the proportions of a combination shown to be old, such as is here involved, may be inventive, such changes must be critical as compared with the proportions used in the prior processes, producing a difference in kind rather than degree.”); In re Wells, 56 F.2d 674, 675, 12 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1932) (“Changes in proportions of agents used in combinations… in order to be patentable, must be critical as compared with the proportions of the prior processes.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018.)(“[A] modification of a process parameter may be patentable if it ‘produce[s] a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art.” (citing Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955); UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 693, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“A difference of degree is not as persuasive as a difference in kind – i.e., if the range produces ‘a new property dissimilar to the known property,’ rather than producing a predictable result but to an unexpected extent.”).
In such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 USPQ2d 1934 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916) (a patent based on a change in the proportions of a prior product or process (changing from 4-10% oil to 1% oil) must be confined to the proportions that were shown to be critical (1%)); In re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74-75, 70 USPQ 204, 205 (CCPA 1946) (“Where the issue of criticality is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a proper showing of the facts upon which he relies.”); In re Becket, 88 F.2d 684 (CCPA 1937) (“Where the component elements of alloys are the same, and where they approach so closely the same range of quantities as is here the case, it seems that there ought to be some noticeable difference in the qualities of the respective alloys. ”); In re Lilienfeld, 67 F.2d 920, 924 (CCPA 1933) (“It is well established that, while a change in the proportions of a combination shown to be old, such as is here involved, may be inventive, such changes must be critical as compared with the proportions used in the prior processes, producing a difference in kind rather than degree.”); In re Wells, 56 F.2d 674, 675, 12 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1932) (“Changes in proportions of agents used in combinations… in order to be patentable, must be critical as compared with the proportions of the prior processes.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 128 USPQ2d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018.)(“[A] modification of a process parameter may be patentable if it ‘produce[s] a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art.”