Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. As explained by the Supreme Court, a claim directed to a judicial exception cannot be made eligible “simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10 n. 14 (1981). Thus, limitations that amount to merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, and cannot integrate a judicial exception into a practical application.

Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than generally linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. As explained by the Supreme Court, a claim directed to a judicial exception cannot be made eligible “simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14, 209 USPQ 1, 10 n. 14 (1981). Thus, limitations that amount to merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, and cannot integrate a judicial exception into a practical application.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

The courts often cite to Parker v. Flook as providing a classic example of a field of use limitation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612, 95 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (2010) (“ Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978)). In Flook, the claim recited steps of calculating an updated value for an alarm limit (a numerical limit on a process variable such as temperature, pressure or flow rate) according to a mathematical formula “in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.” 437 U.S. at 586, 198 USPQ at 196. Processes for the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were used in the petrochemical and oil-refining fields. Id. Although the applicant argued that limiting the use of the formula to the petrochemical and oil-refining fields should make the claim eligible because this limitation ensured that the claim did not preempt all uses of the formula, the Supreme Court disagreed. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. Instead, the additional element in Flook regarding the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons was not sufficient to make the claim eligible, because it was merely an incidental or token addition to the claim that did not alter or affect how the process steps of calculating the alarm limit value were performed. Further, the Supreme Court found that this limitation did not amount to an inventive concept. 437 U.S. at 588-90, 198 USPQ at 197-98. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would “exalt[] form over substance”, because a competent claim drafter could attach a similar type of limitation to almost any mathematical formula. 437 U.S. at 590, 198 USPQ at 197.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

A more recent example of a limitation that does no more than generally link a judicial exception to a particular technological environment is Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 120 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Affinity Labs, the claim recited a broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular content. 838 F.3d at 1255-56, 120 USPQ2d at 1202. The court identified the claimed concept of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content as an abstract idea, and noted that the additional elements limited the wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellular telephones (as opposed to any and all electronic devices such as televisions, cable boxes, computers, or the like). 838 F.3d at 1258-59, 120 USPQ2d at 1204. Although the additional elements did limit the use of the abstract idea, the court explained that this type of limitation merely confines the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) and thus fails to add an inventive concept to the claims. 838 F.3d at 1259, 120 USPQ2d at 1204.

For claim limitations that generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, examiners should explain in an eligibility rejection why they do not meaningfully limit the claim. For example, an examiner could explain that employing generic computer functions to execute an abstract idea, even when limiting the use of the idea to one particular environment, does not add significantly more, similar to how limiting the abstract idea in Flook to petrochemical and oil-refining industries was insufficient. For more information on formulating a subject matter eligibility rejection, see MPEP § 2106.07(a).

For claim limitations that generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, examiners should explain in an eligibility rejection why they do not meaningfully limit the claim. For example, an examiner could explain that employing generic computer functions to execute an abstract idea, even when limiting the use of the idea to one particular environment, does not add significantly more, similar to how limiting the abstract idea in Flook to petrochemical and oil-refining industries was insufficient. For more information on formulating a subject matter eligibility rejection, see MPEP § 2106.07(a).

For claim limitations that generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, examiners should explain in an eligibility rejection why they do not meaningfully limit the claim. For example, an examiner could explain that employing generic computer functions to execute an abstract idea, even when limiting the use of the idea to one particular environment, does not add significantly more, similar to how limiting the abstract idea in Flook to petrochemical and oil-refining industries was insufficient. For more information on formulating a subject matter eligibility rejection, see MPEP § 2106.07(a).